the technology developer(s) and the social processes through which customary uses of the technology evolve. To this end, he argued that the internet is closely regulated by its architecture.
Reidenberg contended that in the light of Lex Informatica's dependence on design choices the attributes of public oversight associated with regulatory regimes could be maintained by shifting the focus of government actions away from direct regulation of cyberspace, toward influencing changes to its architecture. Reidenberg's concept of regulatory control implemented through the control mechanisms already in place in the network architecture led to development of the new cyberpaternalist school. This new school viewed legal controls as merely part of the network of effective regulatory controls in the online environment and suggested that lawmakers seeking to control the online activities of their citizens would seek to control these activities indirectly by mandating changes to the network architecture, or by supporting self-regulatory activities of network designers. This idea was most fully developed and explained by Professor Lawrence Lessig in his classic text Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. 9 As the title reveals Lessig was influenced by Reidenberg's Lex Informatica 10 into developing his 'code is law' thesis. This posits that while there are four modalities of regulation: law, norms, markets and architecture, in cyberspace the regulatory effectiveness of three of these, law, norms and 9 Basic Books, 1999. 10 In truth Lessig had been working on a similar idea himself and indeed he and Reidenberg had been corresponding about their ideas as they developed them independently of each other. Earlier iterations of Lessig's 'Code' argument may be seen in Lawrence Lessig, 'The New Chicago School ' (1998) 27 The Journal of Legal Studies 661 and Lawrence Lessig, 'The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach ' (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review 501. markets are reduced due to the nature of the space. 11 One modality though, as Reidenberg had predicted, is strengthened in the digital environment: the modality of architecture, or to use the label given to it by Lessig in relation to the digital environment 'code'.
Lessig's 'code is law', perhaps more correctly 'code as law', thesis quickly became the focal point of cyber-governance and cyber-regulatory discourse. 12 The discussion quickly recentred from the vibrant debate on the legitimacy of legal controls in cyberspace, which had been active prior to the publication of Reidenberg's and Lessig's works, 13 to a wider engagement on the role of regulatory modalities, and in particular the role played by code. 14 This arguably was the right direction for the academic discourse to move to at that time. It 11 Due to effects such as remoteness, geographical limitations, anonymity and pseudonymity. 12 The distinction between regulation and governance is one which has proven perennially difficult for regulatory theorists. Here the distinction applied is that regulation is 'the intentional use of authority to affect behaviour of a different party according to set standards, involving instruments of information-gathering and behaviour modification.' (Julia Black, 'Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a "Post-Regulatory" World', (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103). Governance is a broader term than regulation. While the term governance has been given a wide range of meanings from varied literatures in the social sciences (see Kees Van Kersbergen & Frans Van Waarden, '"Governance" as a bridge between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy (2004) have remained entrenched in this analysis for too long. I count myself among the worst offenders having spent the bulk of the last fifteen years examining Lessig's models, but I am not the only offender. As the internet has matured it has evolved from a disruptive space into an established space. We see this in almost all aspects of the internet and its use today. The explosive development of disruptive e-business models so prevalent in the .com boom of the late 1990s has been displaced by a settled business environment with a relatively small number of key e-commerce providers (Amazon, Alibaba, JD, Ebay etc), the explosive growth of social media in the 2000s has settled into a few providers (Facebook, Twitter, Weibo, LinkedIn, tumblr) There remains, though an elephant in the room, an assumption or supposition which we all make and which I ask the reader to consider. Are these legal orders, settlements and judgements, which we discuss in the assumption that they carry the full force of law, legitimate? We assume the legitimacy of the Defamation Act 2013, as applied specifically to online content, as it is an Act of the UK Parliament. This is not an unfair assumption but it is an assumption borne of the physical rather than digital world. The UK Parliament draws authority to regulate and control our acts from a number of sources depending on your flavour of legal positivism. If you are Austinian, something of a rarity these days, you point to the fact that Parliament is Sovereign (as the Queen in Parliament) and its acts are therefore laws. 25 If you are a Hartian, more likely today, you will apply the rule of recognition and find that the relevant officials such as Judges will recognize the Act as law, as will citizens. 26 You may not define yourself as a legal positivist -perhaps you prefer the interpretive approach of Ronald Dworkin, among others, and you may trust in Judge Hercules to interpret the body of law in such a way as to recognize the Act and apply its principles. 27 30 It is the one philosophical foundation of law which specifically acknowledges the internet. 31 At each turn though however you define your jurisprudential footing we are discussing a philosophy of legal order defined by reference to the "old world": the world of atoms, borders, sovereigns and lawmakers. Not the new world: the world of bits, pipes, networks and platforms. By turns we find ourselves, some twenty years on from the famous Chicago conference of 1996, returning to the questions that were active then. In the face of increasing legal interventions into online activity by both 
Rule of Law
The astute reader may now suppose that I risk pursuing the wrong line of enquiry:
to use a valuable analogy there is a risk going off down the wrong rabbit hole. They Except I think that as with so many things when we venture outwith the world of atoms and into the world of bits both rabbit holes lead us to the same Wonderland.
So in the remainder of this chapter I'm going to follow both paths and see if we emerge into the same place -in so doing I'm hoping to begin by sketching out a map of where we may find a rule of law for cyberspace.
First I have a difficult definitional problem -No one seems to agree on what the rule of law actually is. Let's start with the formal or thin definition: 'At its core the rule of law, requires that government officials and citizens are bound by and act consistent with the law. This basic requirement entails a set of minimal characteristics: law must be set forth in advance (be prospective), be made public, be general, be clear, be stable and certain, and be applied to everyone according to its terms. In the absence of these characteristics, the rule of law cannot be satisfied.' 32 To this we may add thickness through concepts such as TRS Allan's principles of institutional fairness -'ideas about individual liberty and natural justice, and, more generally, ideas about the requirements of justice and fairness in the relations between government and governed' 33 or thicker still through the incorporation of formal legality, individual rights, democracy, and a further qualitative dimension that might be roughly categorized under the label 'social welfare rights.' 34 We are in danger though as we thicken out understanding of the rule of law to depart from the core legal message an examination of society and inequality. I do not believe this is a role of the rule of law and more to the point Do we find the thin definition rule of law in the Internet? The answer I believe is no and I believe I can demonstrate this on both a theoretical and empirical level.
To begin with the theoretical: We must start by defining our space and our participants. This was the root of that now long forgotten debate in the 1990s between libertarians and Berkman School paternalists. 35 As we may remember David Johnson and David Post argued that the Internet was not susceptible to legal control due to the lack of physical borders online and limits in territorial legitimacy:
The determined seeker of prohibited communications can simply reconfigure his connection so as to appear to reside in a different location, outside the particular locality, state, or country. Because the Net is engineered to work on the basis of "logical," not geographical, locations, any attempt to defeat the independence of messages from physical locations would be as futile as an effort to tie an atom and a bit together. And, moreover, assertions of law-making authority over Net activities on the ground that those activities constitute "entry into" the 35 See n 13 above. physical jurisdiction can just as easily be made by any territorially based authority. If Minnesota law applies to gambling operations conducted on the World Wide Web because such operations foreseeably affect Minnesota residents, so, too, must the law of any physical jurisdiction from which those operations can be accessed. By asserting a right to regulate whatever its citizens may access on the Net, these local authorities are laying the predicate for an argument that Singapore or Iraq or any other sovereign can regulate the activities of U.S. companies operating in cyberspace from a location physically within the United
States. All such Web-based activity, in this view, must be subject simultaneously to the laws of all territorial sovereigns.
Nor are the effects of online activities tied to geographically proximate locations. Information available on the World Wide Web is available simultaneously to anyone with a connection to the global network. The notion that the effects of an activity taking place on that Web site radiate from a physical location over a geographic map in concentric circles of decreasing intensity, however sensible that may be in the nonvirtual world, is incoherent when applied to Cyberspace. A Web site physically located in Brazil, to continue with that example, has no more of an effect on individuals in Brazil than does a Web site physically located in Belgium or Belize that is accessible in Brazil. Usenet discussion groups, to take another example, consist of continuously changing collections of messages that are routed from one network to another, with no centralized location at all; they exist, in effect, everywhere, nowhere in particular, and only on the Net.
Territorial regulation of online activities serves neither the legitimacy nor the notice justifications. There is no geographically localized set of constituents with a stronger and more legitimate claim to regulate it than any other local group. The strongest claim to control comes from the participants themselves, and they could be anywhere. 36 The paternalist response demonstrated the ability of regulators (lawmakers if you will) to leverage effective control. 37 Lessig's code argument remains a tour-de- offending content or face an action in contempt this will affect individuals in Italy, Canada or even Scotland. 41 Now you may say that the effects of the Swedish or English court decision are not strongly felt, the network will route itself around the legal intervention as if it were damage and everything will continue on as it were, UK citizens will still access The Pirate Bay and Scottish citizens will call the philandering footballer Ryan Giggs. This though is to miss the point that the act produced illegitimate, extra jurisdictional, effects: it was not in compliance with the rule of law. This though is only the start of our journey, for the response of the lawmaker faced with failure of their legal intervention is to create further and more restrictive legal interventions. We find that as a citizen subject to the courts of England and Wales offline we become subject to multiple overlapping legal controls online.
Actions we complete, from Kerr's external viewpoint, in the comfort of our own homes may from the internal viewpoint be viewed as occurring elsewhere.
Extradition for acts committed externally in the UK become possible from the internal viewpoint. This you may say is fanciful but let's look at a few individuals who have been caught up in this. In 2013 Yasir Afsar, a British Citizen, was subject to an extradition request from the United Arab Emirates. 42 He had threatened to place naked images of his ex-wife online unless she gave him money following their separation. He then allegedly sent a naked photograph of his ex-wife via 41 The second example draws inspiration from the case of CTB v News Group Newspapers Limited force him to enter a plea agreement which saw him forced to close a website that at the very least was in a legal grey area in the UK, submit to a fine of £20,000 and agree to six months probationary supervision. This is potentially the tip of a very large iceberg. Are you certain nothing you have ever said online has breached s.204 of Nigeria's Criminal Code? 50 What about s.133 of the Thai Criminal Code? 51 What does this mean for the rule of law? Let's return to our principles. The first principle is that law must be set forth in advance (be prospective). This will usually be the case whatever law is being applied and from whichever part of the world so this would appear to be satisfied. The second principle is that the law be made public. This is not quite so simple. While many laws from around the world are made available online not all are and where they are available many are not available in translation. This is a challenge for the rule of law if we accept the principle of extra-territorial effect (as I am arguing). The third principle is that the law be general. This would appear to be satisfied, although I don't know all laws in all jurisdictions which I may be made subject to.
The fourth principle is that the law must be clear. Again there are some problems with this. Language aside there may be cultural references or procedural ones, which are unclear. Even something simple such as do not distribute indecent images of a child require one to know the age of majority. The fifth principle is that 50 Any person who does an act which any class of persons consider as a public insult on their religion, with the intention that they should consider the act such an insult, and any person who does an unlawful act with the knowledge that any class of persons will consider it such an insult, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for two years. 51 Whoever, defaming, insulting or threatening the Sovereign, Queen, Consort, Heir-apparent or Head of Foreign State, shall be imprisoned as from one year to seven years or fined as from two thousand to fourteen thousand Baht, or both. the law must be stable and certain. It is clearly the case that individually each state may have stable laws in terms of the rule of law but collectively the law is inherently unstable and uncertain given the high level of 'churn' across all jurisdictions. For example in December 2013 I asked a room full of British experts on internet law whether the French HADOPI law 52 was still in force. The overwhelming majority of those present were unaware that the French Government had revoked it on 8 July 2013 because the penalties contained therein were considered to be disproportionate. The final principle is that the law be applied to everyone according to its terms. This appears to be satisfied but this may in fact be the problem. Individually each jurisdiction may comply with the thin definition of the rule of law but when we get extra-territorial impact, as we see occurring more and more the thin definition is undermined and the rule of law breaks down.
We are seeing this happen over and over in internet law terms. In the Kim DotCom (Megaupload) case we see a case similar to the O'Dwyer case but with greater publicity and higher stakes. The case which has now been on-going for four years saw an extradition request made in the New Zealand courts by the US Federal Government on grounds of racketeering, money laundering and criminal copyright infringement. The racketeering and money laundering charges stem from the alleged $175 million dollars generated by DotCom's Megaupload site from criminal copyright infringement. A series of cases have challenged the search and arrest warrants issued, the seizure of property and only recently has the extradition case begun. 53 Again the question of the relevance of the United States as a forum for this case is questionable. DotCom lives in New Zealand and the company is registered in Hong Kong. Megaupload would though lease server space and according to the extradition request some of the alleged pirated content was hosted in the US on leased servers in Ashburn, Virginia, which gave US authorities jurisdiction. This though was only a small part of the companies operation and although this clearly gave the US Federal authorities jurisdiction over that content, it is not the case this gives them jurisdiction over the entire global operation of the company. Surely that is better reserved to either New Law. 62 It is the fundamental rule by which all other rules are identified and understood. According to Hart, a legal system is primitive if it consists of just a series of primary rules that assign duties and obligations to the citizenry. This is because a society that issues only primary rules suffers from several deficiencies.
To make up for those deficiencies, the society must issue secondary rules. These are of three types: rules of change, which allow primary rules to be extinguished or modified; rules of adjudication, which empower individuals to determine whether a primary rule has been broken; and, most importantly, the rule of recognition, which serves as an authoritative acknowledgment that the primary rules are the proper way of doing things. A legal system that contains these three types of secondary rules is, in Hart's view, fully developed. 63 In a gross simplification of Hart's position a rule or order becomes a law when it is recognized as such by the relevant officers of society. Of course the rule is much more sophisticated than this and learning to recognize laws (as opposed to other forms of rules) is complexified by the nature of modern complex legal systems. In modern systems with multiple sources of law, rules of recognition can be quite complex and require a hierarchy where some types rules overrule others. But, by far the most important function of the rule of recognition is that it allows us to determine the validity of a rule. Validity is what allows us to determine which rules should be considered laws, and therefore, which rules should create obligations for citizens with an internal perspective to the law. According to Hart, validity is not determined by whether a rule is obeyed, its morality, or its efficiency, but by whether it fits the criteria set forth by the rule of recognition. In more complex 62 Above n 26. 63 Ibid 91-99. legal systems we may have to trace the origin of a rule back a few steps to the source of its authority. 64 In the context of Hart's definition of validity (whether the law is derived from a source and in a manner approved by other rules) it simply does not make sense to ask about the validity of the rule of recognition in its supreme form. Once we have reached the rule of recognition, there is no higher level of rules to provide us with the criteria with which to judge its validity.
What does this mean for our examples? One approach is to take the external view and to say that the rule is functioning perfectly well. Yasir Afsar was not extradited I believe that although we can rationalize the application of laws external to our jurisdiction in these internal internet cases through institutional value, doing so fails to acknowledge the elephant in the room (we have gone from Rabbits to Elephants) which is that Hart's rule of recognition expects commonality of What about standards of taste and decency? Once one internalizes the concept of 'going to' or 'socializing' in the network our traditional legal foundations are under challenge and as international legal institutions and orders draw authority from the sovereign states which construct them so too do orders of international public and private law. I believe (in a less clear cut way) this rabbit hole leads to the same Wonderland. We have rules, laws even, for online actions, we can interpret how the law applies to these actions but we need urgently to address the key question -are they legitimate.
Conclusion
I promised a map of where we could go to identify a rule of law for the internet.
I'm afraid this chapter falls somewhat short of that. I can though tell you where the map is to be found. It is in Orin Kerr's divide between the internal and the external view of the network. For as long as lawmakers, courts and other adjudicatory bodies attempt to use both perspectives we will never have an effective rule of law for the internet. Too often authorities cherry pick whichever view they want to fit the situation they have before them so as Kerr notes when the US legal system allows prosecutors to choose to enforce either the external view (as in United States v. Kammersell 66 (bomb threat interstate)) and the internal view (as in United States v. Thomas 67 (obscenity distribution)) depending upon which is better for their case we can never have an effective rule of law for the internet. This is true on the micro level and truer on the macro (interjurisdictional) level. Hence I have my map, as now do you. We now just need to see where the road takes us.
